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Abstract
This paper examines the role of cultural values and family decision-making in the gender distribu-
tion of higher education on a panel database of 9 fields of study in 26 OECD countries over 1998-2012.
The paper surmises an interplay between family-friendly policies and cultural values that might be
associated with gender segregation. Using survey data from the World Value Survey, the results sug-
gest that gender-egalitarian attitudes of females are negatively associated with gender segregation.
However, attitudes of males are not associated with significant coefficients. Marriage market indi-
cators, such as the age at first marriage, are positively associated with gender segregation. Finally,
family-friendly policies are found to display a positive association with segregation in societies that
are attached to traditional gender roles in the labor market. To the contrary, the same policies are
negatively associated with segregation in gender-egalitarian societies. These findings are robust to
country and field-specific levels of segregation, and remain using alternative specifications and estima-
tion techniques.
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1 Introduction
The reversal of the gender participation gap in higher education over the last three decades in Western
countries came along with the concentration of female and male graduates in specific fields of study. This
phenomenon is known as horizontal gender segregation and refers to the over-representation of women
and men in certain fields of study. Generally speaking, females are over-represented in care-related and
humanistic fields, whereas males dominate technical and scientific fields. A great body of research in
economics, sociology and psychology provides a wide variety of social and economic forces that might
operate both to perpetuate and to reduce gender disparities in the choice of fields of study in higher
education. Yet there is a lack of systematic research to examine whether extant theories of segregation
are consistent with actual trends (Mann and DiPrete (2013)).
Empirical evidence suggests that horizontal gender segregation is among the causes of the gender income
gap among college graduates (Brown and Corcoran (1997), Bobbitt-Zeher (2007))1. In the aggregate,
gender segregation in education crucially matters to the skill composition of the future workforce (Altonji
et al. (2015)). By artificially shaping the accumulation of human capital, gender segregation in education
may influence labor market productivity, and thus be an important determinant of economic growth
(Dollar and Gatti (1999), Knowles et al. (2002), Klasen and Lamanna (2009)). Specifically, the scarcity
of female graduates in science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM) fields has gained scholarly
attention recently (Sassler et al. (2017), Card and Payne (2017), Kahn and Ginther (2017)). Indeed,
horizontal gender segregation represents a major concern in educational and labor market policy-making
(OECD (2006), EIGE (2014), SheFigures (2012)).
The current paper studies the role of cultural values and family decision-making in horizontal gender
segregation in advanced economies. Research on culture in economic behavior finds that cultural values
might be decisive for economic decisions of agents (Guiso et al. (2006), Ferna´ndez (2011)). More specially,
Fortin (2005) provides suggestive evidence on that cultural values are at the heart of gender disparities
in labor market outcomes. Economic research also accounts for potential influences of individual deci-
sions regarding the marriage market and family formation plans on educational and labor market choices
of women and men (Badgett and Folbre (2003), Goldin (2006), Chiappori et al. (2009), Attanasio and
Kaufmann (2017)). Drawing upon these accounts, I surmise that attitudes towards gender roles in the
labor market, the marriage market and family-friendly policies might drive gender segregation in higher
education. Furthermore, I hypothesize a differential association between family-friendly policies and gen-
der segregation contingent upon gender-egalitarian attitudes.
1See Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005 for a meta-study in wage differentials between women and men.
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The role of cultural values in previous works on horizontal gender segregation in higher education were
absent due to limited availability of precise data on cultural attitudes and empirical methods (Castles
and Marceau (1989), England and Li (2006), Charles and Bradley (2002, 2009)). This paper adds to ex-
isting empirical models of horizontal gender segregation by including cultural values -measured by survey
data-, and family decision-making indicators -using administrative data- as potential factors of gender
segregation in a panel data econometric setting. I construct an extensive panel dataset that combines
information on country-level segregation (dissimilarity index) and field-specific segregation (association
index) in nine fields of study in 26 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries over 1998-2012.
I employ four waves (1995-98; 1999-04; 2005-08; 2010-12) of the World Value Survey (WVS) to measure
attitudes of the role of women in the labor market, reproductive rights and religion. Attitudes towards
gender roles are measured by the disagreement on the statement ”When jobs are scarce, men should have
more right to a job than women.” Regarding attitudes towards reproductive rights, I consider the level
of agreement on the question ”Abortion is always justifiable.” I measure religion by the statement ”God
is very important in my life.” As of family decision-making, I first add to the empirical model individual
choices regarding the marriage market, such as divorce rates and the average age at first marriage. Finally,
I consider institutional arrangements to support family formation as potential factors of segregation. I
include family-friendly policies measured by the number of weeks of mother-specific and father-specific
leaves (Jaumotte (2003)).
There are important limitations of this research that relate widely on the nature of the data employed.
Previous research using cohort data finds gender differentials in education and labor market outcomes
on the basis of demographics, such as immigration (Alonso-Villar et al. (2012)), socioeconomic status
(Bailey and Dynarski (2011), van de Werfhorst (2017)), parents’ educational attainment and labor mar-
ket participation rates (Ferna´ndez (2013), Farre´ and Vella (2013)). However, the data here employed
divides graduates solely by gender and field of study, and thus, potential intersections between gender
and demographics cannot be considered here.
Notwithstanding the efforts to circumvent causality issues, the results provided below should be tenta-
tively interpreted as partical correlations. The terms ”impacts” or ”effects” of the explanatory variables
intend to ease the interpretation of the results but the reader should feel free to interpret them as partial
correlations2.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the patterns of horizontal gender segregation
2See Charles and Bradley (2002) for a deeper discussion on causality issues in empirical analysis of the effect of cultural
attitudes and social norms in horizontal gender segregation.
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at both country and field-specific levels in the countries of the sample. Section 3 specifies panel data
econometric models to study the role of cultural values and family decision-making in horizontal gender
segregation. Section 4 shows the main empirical results. A final section concludes.
2 Trends of Horizontal Gender Segregation
2.1 Raw Data
I employ administrative data collected from the OECD Education Database on the number of female and
male graduates in nine International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997, 1 digit-level)
fields of study in 26 OECD countries over 1998-20123. Empirical evidence shows high levels of attrition
in gender-atypical choices, specifically in female students (Mastekaasa and Smeby (2008)). I focus on
graduate completion rather on enrollment data to alleviate this potential bias. On average, the share
of females in higher education over the period considered outnumber that of males, with the exception
of Switzerland (44.6%), Turkey (45.5%), Republic of Korea (48.7%), Luxembourg (49.4%). The sample
average of the percentage of female graduates have increased by 6 percentage points (pp) over 1998-2012.
The share of females has slightly increased in all fields over the period considered, although it varies across
fields of study (see Figure A1 in Appendix A1). Women are generally over-represented in education and
health and welfare fields rates (75%) and humanities and arts (70%). Social science, business and law,
and to a lesser extent services are closer to the overall gender distribution in higher education. Women are
under-represented in science and engineering, manufacturing and construction fields (38.8% and 23.2%,
respectively).
2.2 Measures of Country-level Segregation
To explore the trends of the distribution of women and male across fields of study in higher education,
I employ three alternative nominal measures of gender segregation: widely-used Dissimilarity Index
(Duncan and Duncan (1955)), the variation of the dissimilarity index developed in Karmel and Maclachlan
(1988) and the Association index (Charles and Grusky (1995)). It is important to stress that the measures
of segregation here employed are nominal measures, which in sharp contrast to ordinal measures, do not
take into account a hierarchical ordering of the educational system (Semyonov and Jones (1999)).
3Table A1 and A2 in Appendix A shows the fields of study and sample countries. See Andersson and Olsson (1999) for
an explicit definition of the subfields considered in each of field of study.
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The index of dissimilarity (ID hereafter) was first developed in racial segregation studies by Duncan
and Duncan (1955). The ID index is one of the primary measures of segregation applied to the context
of gender segregation in labor markets and education, and it has been acknowledged as the index of
segregation (Watts (1998); Gelbgiser and Albert (2017)). The ID index is given by the following formula:
ID =
1
2
∑
i
| Fi
F
− Mi
M
| ∗100 (1)
Where Fi and Mi are females and males in field i, F and M are respectively the total of female graduates
and total male graduates. Following Duncan and Duncan (1955), the ID index is interpreted as the
percentage of women (men) that would have to change fields without replacement in order to make their
distribution identical with that of men (women). The index takes values from 0%, indicating total gender
integration across fields, to 100%, indicating a complete gender segregation.
The easy interpretation and computation of the ID index come at certain technical costs that have been
widely noted in sociology (Charles and Grusky (1995), Watts (1998)). The main flaw of the ID index is
its margin-dependency on the share of fields in the overall higher education system. If education systems
are dominated by a highly segregated field, the ID would yield higher values than if the dominant field
was evenly composed by women and men, and numerous small fields were highly segregated. Therefore,
changing trends of fields’ share could disguise some patterns in segregation which ultimately obscures
cross-national and inter-temporal comparisons. It should be noticed that the shares of graduates in each
field over the total graduate body remain stable over the time period analyzed. That said, I employ
the ID index in the present analysis to allow for comparisons with existing works on horizontal gender
segregation in education (England and Li (2006), Barone (2011), Blau et al. (2013), van de Werfhorst
(2017)).
Figure 1.a displays the evolution of the sample averages of the ID index, along with two clusters of
countries: Scandinavian countries (Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and Mediterranean countries
(Portugal Italy, Spain and Greece). The differential trends uncovered below give the flavor of the countries
disparities regarding segregation levels. Sample average of the ID index has decreased from 31.5% to 27.6%
over 1998-2012. A decreasing trend is also shown on average by Scandinavian countries, reducing the
index from 37.3% to 32.3%. However, in the cluster of Mediterranean countries the average ID index has
increased by 2 pp (23.7% to 25.7%). Economic theories on human capital and cultural change, together
with sociological theories of modernization predict less segregation in Scandinavian countries (see Estevez-
Abe (2005)). However, Scandinavian countries are among the most segregated higher education systems
in the OECD. This observation is also found in existing works on both education and the labor market,
namely the Scandinavian paradox (Albrecht et al. (2003), Evertsson et al. (2009), Carlsson (2011)).
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Figure 1: Dissimilarity Index
Figure 1.b shows the levels of ID index for each country in the sample. Turkey is the less segregated
country of the sample, with an average ID index of 17.1%. The most segregated country is Finland
(42.1%), in which ID index remains quite stable during the period 1998-2012.
As suggested in Bettio et al. (2009), no single index of segregation is fully satisfactory. Therefore, I
complement the ID index with the country-level segregation measure defined in Karmel and MacLachlan
(1988), known as the IP index (IP hereafter)4, which provides the percentage of women who would have
to change fields with replacement to bring about an equal gender distribution across fields of study.
The IP index trades the margin-dependency of the field structure of the overall higher education for a
mechanical sensitivity on the gender composition of the overall higher education (Watts (1998)).
2.3 Measures of Field-specific Segregation
The above measures provide information on the extent to which higher education systems are gender
segregated at a country-level. However, these measures fall short to identify the exact fields that should
be integrated or de-segregated to erode gender segregation in higher education. I employ the log-linear
modeling approach of Charles and Grusky (1995) to fill this gap. Charles and Grusky’s approach define
an index, namely the association index (Ai henceforth), which measures the factor by which each field is
4The IP index results from the following transformation IP = 2 ∗ F
N
∗ 1−F
N
∗ ID, where F is the total number of female
graduates, M the total of male graduates and N total graduates. Figures A2 and A3 in Appendix A show that IP index
trends are similar to that of ID index.
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associated to a gender (female or male)5. The Ai index is computed as follows:
Ai = ln
Fi
Mi
− [1
j
∗
∑
ln(
Fi
Mi
)] (2)
Where ln is the natural logarithm, j is the number of fields (this number is 9 in this analysis, corresponding
to the ISCED1997 1 digit-level), Fi is the number of females in field i and Mi is the number of males
in field i. The Ai provides a scale of the extent by which each field of study is gender-labeled. Positive
values of the Ai indicate that the field is associated with women, values near to zero are interpreted as
gender-neutral fields, whereas negative values mean a male association of the field. The index gives the
factor by which fields are associated with a specific gender, and higher absolute magnitudes mean higher
segregation. The main advantage of this measure is that by using log-linear techniques, the association
between gender and field choice is neither affected by the share of each field in different country nor by the
share of female among graduates. Hence, it is suitable for cross-country and inter-temporal comparisons.
The Ai index comes also at certain computational costs summarized in Watts (1998).
The dissimilarity and association indices are sensitive to the levels of aggregation used in defining fields
of study (Reskin (1993); Nelson (2017)). These indices are higher when using narrow categorizations of
higher education (e.g. higher dividing higher education in many fields) than using broader categorizations
(e.g. dividing higher education in few broad fields). By using a nine-field categorization of higher
education, this paper supplements the work of Charles and Bradley (2009) who use four fields of study:
math/natural science, engineering, health/other, humanities/social science. Thus, the current paper
tackles the disparities among gender-dominated fields, such as humanistic and social sciences fields, that
were concealed in previous studies.
Figure 2 shows that the fields of education and health and welfare are on average associated with women,
with Ai values around 1. Instead, engineering, manufacturing and construction fields are associated with
men and to a greater factor (-1.5). Science and humanities and arts are associated at a similiar factor
around an absolute magnitude of 0.5: humanities and arts is associated with females (0.5), whereas
science is associated with males (-0.5). These descriptive data are consistent with the two divides already
found in the literature, that refer to a care-technical and a humanistic-scientific divides (Barone, 2011).
The trends of gender-labeling at the sample average remain stable over 1998-2012, although humanities
and arts, services and agriculture are less gender-labeled at the end of the period analyzed (see Figure
A4, Appendix A).
Figure 3 provides differences in gender-labeling across OECD countries in the four most segregated fields,
namely education (3.a), health and welfare (3.b), engineering (3.c) and science (3.d). The graphs provide
5See Charles and Bradley (2002), (2009), Barone (2011), Mann and DiPrete (2013) for existing applications of the index
in the context of segregation in education.
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Figure 2: Association Index (sample average)
the range of Ai values that each of the sample country displays over the period 1998-2012. This measure
allows for identifying different cross-country patterns in gender-labeling. For instantce, Mediterranean
women concentrate more in education fields whereas their Scandinavian counterparts do so in health-
related fields. This evidence goes in line with the finding in Alesina et al. (2011) on how gender-labeling of
occupations hinges upon a geographical basis, which might be behind the differences in women crowding
out in different fields of study in Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries. Ellingsæter (2013) focuses
on Scandivanian labor markets to consider a potential relationship between horizontal disparities -i.e.
horizontal segregation- and the type of social democratic and welfare state. Disparities in the welfare
state expansion experienced in Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries might hint this education-
health cleavage in female-dominated fields. Specifically, the transfer of care work from families to the
public sector in Scandinavian labor markets, might be a potential driver of cross-country differences in
women’s concentration by fields of study. Unfortunately, in the lack of survey country-year data on
women and men preferences over fields of study, the current paper cannot delve further into the causes
behind the different patterns in gender-labeling across countries.
In sum, country-level measures of segregation (ID index) reveal a slight reduction in sample average
levels of gender segregation. However, the gender-labeling of fields is persisting over the period considered.
On the whole, the above descriptive analysis tends to suggest the already noted slowdown in gender
integration in higher education over the 1970-1990 period (England and Li (2006), Mann and DiPrete
(2013), Bronson (2014)). These stalled trends in gender-labeling of fields may complement the slowdown
in gender convergence in other societal realms since the mid-1990s (see inter alia Blau et al. (2006),
England (2010, 2011), Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016)).
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Figure 3: Association in Most Gendered Fields
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3 Cultural Values, Family Decision-Making and Gender Segregation
3.1 Extant Explanations
Social science, psychology and endocrinology research coincide on that gender segregation is unlikely
to be drawn by a unique factor. The synthesis of Ceci and Williams (2010) suggests that among the
potential factors of segregation, preferences and choices -either free or constrained- seem to play a crucial
role for the under-representation of women in math-related fields. The economic literature provides a
great body of research on the causes of gender segregation in education, in which discrimination, gaps
in career and family aspirations, and social norms seem to crucially matter to gender segregation. Neo-
classical economics provide rational choice arguments of gender disparities in educational investments,
summarized in Altonji and Blank (1999). Demand-side arguments suggest that women prefer fields that
minimize the costs of forced labor market interruption and alleviate work-family conflicts (Becker (1991);
Polacheck and Rosenberger (1978)). On the supply-side, Becker’s theory of discrimination (1957) sug-
gests that potential mistreatment of women according to their subjective tastes of employers enacts a
traditional division of labor, in which women and men tend to move into gender-typical occupations.
Early explanations also suggest a skill-differential and cognitive gaps between women and men. These
often-repeated arguments have lost momentum in the last decades in the face of experimental research
showing how gender gaps in risk-taking, competitive-leaning and social beliefs drive gender choices of
fields of study (Croson and Gneezy (2009), Buser et al. (2014)).
Newer explanations of horizontal gender segregation emphasize the role of gender identity and social
norms. Scholars identify how gender identity may shape the economic behavior of agents (Folbre (1994);
Akerlof and Kranton (2000))6. The game theory model of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) considers an
identity-based utility of behavioral choices of individuals. Following the behavioral prescriptions for the
gender assigned to agents produces a form of utility. Affirming one’s identity as a ”man” or as a ”woman”
is rewarded, whereas violating the prescriptions evokes anxiety and discomfort, or in other words, dis-
utility. An important implication of the model of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) is that allows to define
non-pecuniary benefits derived from the choice of educational paths. Thus, individuals have an intrinsic
motivation to behave such that they receive a positive evaluation from the society (Humlum et al. (2012)).
This logic might explain why certain agents self-select in low-paid occupations, and more generally, how
preferences are crucial to our understanding of gender disparities in educational and occupational choices
(Eccles and Jacobs (1986), Zafar (2013)).
6For a generic, theoretical approach see also Be´nabou and Tirole (2007)
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Economic literature on the role of cultural values in economic behavior complements our understanding
of the potential causes horizontal gender segregation (Guiso et al. (2006)). The intergenerational trans-
mission of gender norms are found to explain gender differences in individual preferences in the labor
market (Blau et al. (2013), Ferna´ndez et al. (2004)) and educational choices (Humlum et al. (2017),
van de Werfhorst (2017)). One may consider that the utility -pecuniary and non-pecuniary- gained by
gender-typical choices defined in Akerlof and Kranton’s model are shaped by gender stereotypes and
cultural values that dictate attitudes towards gender roles in a society7. Cultural values that reinforce
gender-essentialist ideals -i.e. widely shared beliefs that women are better at care, nurturing, and human
interaction whereas men excel at abstract thinking, problem solving, and analysis-, might shape gendered
identities of individual men and women (Sikora and Pokropek (2012), Charles et al. (2015)). Adding to
this rationale, cross-country and epidemiological studies relate gender-equality and gaps between girls and
boys in math performance (Guiso et al. (2008), Nollenberger et al. (2016), Kahn and Ginther (2017)).
Consequently, one might consider that cultural values potentially determine -either direct or indirectly-
the extent of gender segregation across fields of study.
The role of cultural values and family decision-making in gender-typical choices of fields have been some-
how absent in previous international comparisons, primarily due to the lack of accurate data on social
norms and attitudes towards gender roles. Existing empirical approaches to horizontal gender segregation
are either cross-country analysis (England and Li (2006), Charles and Bradley (2009)) or country-specific
(Humlum et al. (2017), van de Werfhorst (2017)). The aim of this section is to fill this gap by employing
survey data on cultural values and administrative data on family decision-making of advanced economies
in a panel data econometric setting.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
I propose a fixed-effects model to study the role of cultural values and family decision-making indicators
in horizontal gender segregation. I first attempt to evaluate the extent to which attitudes towards gender
roles in the labor market, reproductive rights and religion exert an effect in segregation. I second evaluate
whether indicators of the marriage market have explanatory power on the levels of segregation across
fields of study in higher education. A final step of the empirical analysis considers whether state support
for family formation has an indirect effect in segregation levels that hinges upon the attitudes towards
7In a sense, identity and culture economics come in a lockstep so long as the former defines non-pecurniary benefits of
choosing a gender-typical fields and the latter dictates the way fields of study are gender-labeled.
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gender roles in the labor market.
IDct = β0 + CV
′
ctβ +MM
′
ctβ + +FP
′
ctβ +X
′
ctβ + γt + αc + uct
c = country; t = year (3)
where IDct is the dissimilarity index in country c in year t, γt and αc are time fixed-effects and country
fixed-effects respectively, whereas uct is the error term. The primary set of variables of interest are included
in CVct, which refers to measures of cultural values, MMct regards marriage market indicators and FPct
captures different forms of institutional support for family formation (i.e. family-friendly policies). Xct
refers to country time-varying characteristics of the economic structure, the labor market and educational
systems that have been empirically informed to drive segregation in previous research.
I construct an extensive panel dataset with information on dissimilarity and association indices for 26
OECD economies over the 1998-2012 period. The first step of this analysis focuses on country-level
segregation by using as the benchmark dependent variable the ID index, while the IP index will serve
as robustness check. A second step studies whether the results at country-level segregation hold when
using field-specific measures of segregation (Ai). Table 1 provides the summary statistics over the period
considered.
3.3 Main Explanatory variables
Cultural Values
I employ four waves (1995-98; 1999-04; 2005-08; 2010-12) of the World Value Survey (WVS) to measure
cultural values towards gender roles in the labor market, views on reproductive rights and religion.
Attitudes towards gender roles:
Drawing on Guiso et al. (2003), Fortin (2005) and Azmat et al. (2006), I operationalize gender-egalitarian
attitudes by means of the share of WVS respondents who disagree on the statement ”When jobs are scarce,
men should have more right on a job that women” (% Disagree Men First)8. The transformation from
traditional to egalitarian attitudes towards gender roles paved the way to the convergence of female and
male educational investment and labor market outcomes (Fortin (2005), Mandel and Semyonov (2006)).
On this account, one might expect sex-stereotypes to be positively associated with segregation. However,
this argument is contested by the observation of highly segregated education systems in gender-egalitarian
8I have also considered other WVS questions, such as the ”A university education is more important for a boy than for
a girl”. Disagreement with this statement is likewise %Disagree Men First, associated with a negative effect in segregation.
This alternative model is available upon request.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Main Covariates
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent Variables
ID index 29.83 5.688 10.547 44.233 285
IP index 14.419 2.82 5.273 21.231 285
Association Index
Education 1.05 .26 .34 2.05 99
Humanities and Arts .43 .25 -.11 .82 99
Social Science .10 .21 -.23 .63 99
Science -.68 .28 -1.45 -.13 99
Engineering -1.44 .26 -1.96 -.91 99
Agriculture -.28 .30 -1.06 .43 99
Health and Welfare 1.00 .28 .26 1.49 99
Services -.05 .26 -.87 .55 99
NKOU -.01 .44 -1.43 .71 51
Cultural Values (WVS)
% Disagree Men First 61.643 19.506 24.019 93.619 189
% Pro-Choice 10.986 7.602 1.25 45.771 189
% God Important 23.172 16.638 7.532 75.78 188
% Disagree Men First (fem) 64.675 18.948 28.364 95 182
% Pro-Choice (fem) 10.892 8.099 0.942 47.096 182
% God Important (fem) 27.673 18.273 8.163 78.358 181
% Disagree Men First (male) 57.818 21.043 14.379 92.247 182
% Pro-Choice (male) 11.274 7.455 1.338 44.288 182
% God Important (male) 18.53 15.82 4.573 73.225 181
% Disagree Men First gap 1.187 0.295 0.971 2.366 182
% Pro-Choice gap 0.926 0.221 0.303 1.469 182
% God Important gap 1.713 0.559 1.033 3.748 181
Marriage Market
Divorce rate 2.167 0.687 0.4 3.8 278
Fertility 1.594 0.29 1.076 2.23 278
Marri. Age Fem. 28.339 2.048 23.3 32.8 265
Marri. Age Males 30.892 2.078 25.9 35.9 258
Age mum 29.498 1.082 26.4 31.4 272
Family Policies
TPL 59.439 52.671 0 164 278
LML 17.666 8.275 0 52 278
PLJP 75.785 57.019 0 156 278
Paid Father 4.164 7.312 0 52 278
Control Variables
Pop. density 142.32 132.518 2.734 505.562 285
% Employees 83.625 7.495 58.904 93.498 285
% Services 67.321 7.36 49.171 82.964 285
% LF Female 44.692 3.156 25.852 48.575 285
% Prof. Female 49.424 7.415 30.51 64.707 285
Size Grads 11.569 1.471 5.823 15.012 285
Diversification 19.1 16.042 0 60.004 285
% Graduates Fem. 57.254 5.673 25.391 67.5 285
Score gap 0.991 0.013 0.961 1.038 278
Field Weight .12 .1 .00 .46 843
Country averages using sample in Column 1 (Table 2)
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countries, such as the patterns shown for Scandinavian countries in Section 2.
Scholars note that gender disparities that have clear, well-defined hierarchical structures are more easily
undermined than horizontal ones (Goldin (2006), Shavit et al. (2007)). Thus, horizontal segregation can
reconcile to a greater extent gender-egalitarian and gender-essentialism values9.
Reproduction rights:
Drawing on Inglehart et al. (2017), I consider that the shift from pro-fertility to individual-choice norms
can provide women with higher agency to monitor their educational investments and family formation
design. The use of contraceptive technology transformed female work of the cohorts born after World
War II (Goldin and Katz (2002)), as more control over their reproduction reduced womens’ future work-
family conflicts. My prior is that more favorable attitudes towards reproductive rights may be associated
with a convergence between women and men in higher education. I proxy attitudes towards reproductive
rights by the share of WVS respondents who agree equal to 10 in a 0-10 scale on that ”Abortion is always
justifiable” (% Pro-choice).
Religiosity:
The set of cultural values includes the share of WVS respondents who assess equal to 10, on a 0-10 scale,
that ”God as very important in their life” (% God Important). By so doing, I attempt to control for
potential correlations beween religious beliefs and gender segregation. This statement is present in the
four WVS waves employed here, whereas other alternative religion-related WVS questions were asked in
fewer waves. Guiso et al. (2003) use also WVS data and associate religion with higher intolerance towards
gender-egalitarian values and more conservative gender attitudes. Appendix A includes the average levels
of cultural values for the sample of countries and their correlations with dissimilarity index (Figure A5)
and gender differences on cultural values (Figure A6).
Marriage Market
Family formation plans are found to impact on the share of women in math-related fields (Ceci and
Williams (2010, 2015)). Indeed, Pepin and Cotter (2018) suggest that gender-egalitarian values in the
labor market might be countervailed by gender-essentialist ideals and traditional family decisions in af-
fluent societies. I surmise family decision-making to have potential segregative effects, and approach
to these features from an individual dimension -marriage market-, and from an institutional dimension
-family-friendly polices.
9This idea corresponds to the ”separate-but-equal” gender beliefs that are further explored in Charles and Bradley (2009)
and England (2010).
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Goldin (2006) accounts for a quiet revolution that transformed American women’s horizon, identity
and decision-making in the aftermath of World War II. Divorce laws, increasing age of marriage and
motherhood, and reducing fertility were among the underpinnings of this quiet revolution, namely the
revolutionary indicators. A crucial implication of this revolution in gender segregation is that it trans-
formed the women’s role in the labor market from a job-focus to a career-design. As divorce rate and age
of marriage increased, Goldin argues, a greater fraction of women and men’ lives would spend married
reduces, and economic independence becomes more valuable. The identity of women changed towards a
career oriented, and ultimately, divorce rates contributed to an insurance-based motive for college invest-
ment. Based on Goldin (2006), rising average age of marriage would imply women to be more serious in
college, plan for an independent future, and form their identities before marriage and family. I make use
of the revolutionary indicators, in Goldins parlance, such as divorce rate (Divorce rate, OECD Family
database) and the average age of marriage of females (Marri Age Fem, OECD Family Database), in the
set of potential explanatory variables of sex segregation in higher education.
Based on Goldin’s arguments, one might expect both increasing divorce rates and age of marriage to
be associated with integrative effects. However, other studies of the marriage market and gender-typical
choices in the labor market suggest otherwise. Badgett and Folbre (2003) found that gender conformity
in occupational position is rewarded for women and men in the marriage market, leading to a trade-off
between the returns of majors in the labor market and the marriage market10. Along these lines, recent
empirical research finds that labor market and marriage market are important determinants of college
enrollment: the former has larger effects on males decision and the latter is more relevant in the case of
women (Attanasio and Kaufmann (2017)).
Family-Friendly Policies
I build upon labor economics literature to link family policies with potential effects on gender differences
in educational choices. Family-friendly policies, such as maternity leaves, parental leaves and childcare
leaves, are forms of state childcare provision designated to boost female participation by reducing work-
life conflicts and facilitate family-life (Jaumotte 2003). However, the net effect of this policies is nowhere
close to being clear-cut: proponents cheer the facilitation of this political arrangements to combine careers
and motherhood for women and altering social gender attitudes towards modern values. To the contrary,
these policies may incur in a loss of work experience of women and in higher costs of hiring childbearing-
10See also Badgett and Folbre (1999) for an overview of educational attainment in the linkage between marriage market
and gender-atypical occupational choices.
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age females, and thus encouraging statistical discrimination (Blau et al. (2013), Olivetti and Petrongolo
(2017)). Drawing on these conflicting views, I consider a potential association between family-friendly
policies and the choice of field of study by women and men. I follow Jaumotte (2003, 2004) and proxy
institutional childcare support by using OECD data on the length of maternity leave (LML), parental
leave with job protection (PLJP), total parental leave (TPL), and father-specific paid leave (Paid father).
Recall that the data employed does not allow to consider a causal effect from family policies to gendered
choices of students. Nonetheless, the inclusion of these policies in the empirical strategy might capture
societal demands towards work-family balance and upgrading women’s role in the labor market, and serve
us to consider its potential correlation with gender educational choices.
IDct = β0 + β1%DisagreeMenFirstct + β2FamilyPolicyct+
+ β3%DisagreeMenFirst ∗ FamilyPolicyct +MM ′ctβ + β + γt + αc + uct
c = country; t = year (4)
I finally surmise that the potential association between family-friendly policies and gender segregation
in education depends on the level of cultural values. One may consider that in more gender-egalitarian
societies, women and men might be less likely to establish a traditional division of household work. In that
cases, if female work-family burdens are reduced, gender might be less salient in the choices of fields of
study in higher education. Consequently, a potential side-effect of family policies might be a convergence
in women and men’ educational choices and a reduction in horizontal gender segregation. Nonetheless,
as explained in Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017), the identification of the causal effect of family policies in
segregation is fraught by several challenges which forces a cautious interpretation of these results.
3.4 Control Variables
The term Xct is a vector of economic, labor market and education systems variables at country c at
time t. I first include the population density (Pop. density), measured by the number of people per
square kilometer of land area (World Bank dataset), to keep constant potential foreign and multicultural
influences in city dwellers behavior in contrast to rural areas that might be more attached to traditional
values of family and religion. Economic structural changes of post-industrial economies are everywhere
associated with an expansion of the service sector (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016) and found to partially
offset the integrative effects of gender-egalitarian cultural values (Charles and Bradley, 2002 pag 576).
This leads to the creation of jobs particularly suited to women’s preferences, resulting in rising female
16
employment and facilitating changes in social norms (see Goldin (1990, 2006), Olivetti and Petrongolo
(2014), Ngai and Petrongolo (2017)). To control for these fundamental changes in the economic structure,
I employ the share of employees (in contrast to own-account workers) in total employment (% Employees)
and the weight of employees in the service sector to total employment (% Serv. Economy), both collected
from ILO-LABORSTA dataset.
Gender disparities in labor market outcomes provide newcomers of higher education with information on
labor market pay-offs of educational choices (Xie and Shauman (1997)). In that sense, upgrading female
occupational status may predispose women to seek training in male-dominated fields, such as engineering
or science, since they perceive more labor market opportunities (Polachek (1987), Ramirez and Wotipka
(2001)). To capture this potential integrative mechanism, I include the percentage of professionals who
are women (% Prof. Fem) based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88)
by ILO-LABORSTA11.
The set of control variables includes three main features of higher education systems. First, the share
of graduates to total population (Size Grads, OECD Education Database and World Bank). As overall
participation in higher education increases, the elite luster of universities and higher education fades off.
Thus, a smaller share of students will possess an elite identity and sense of self-efficacy, which are required
for transgressing cultural gender norms (Charles and Bradley, 2009). Similarly, the second education
systems’ control is female participation, measured by the percentage of females in the overall graduate
student body (% Graduates Fem). Sociologic research is inconclusive on whether the dominance of females
in overall higher education has an integrative or segregative impact12. Third, the expansion of vocational
studies in higher education has been found to increase gender segregation (Brunello and Checchi (2007),
Blossfeld et al. (2015), Hillmert (2015)). I control for the breadth of vocational education by means of
the share of graduates in ISCDE1997 level 5 Type B in the total higher education (Diversification).
Finally, I attempt to rule out potential segregative effects of gender disparities in academic performance
by including the female to male ratio13 of secondary education performance in math and science domains
(Score gap). I employ the panel database provided in Quality of Education Database of Altinok et
11The share of females in professional occupations and in the labor force have been used in extant studies to proxy gender
attitudes. However, these variables fall short to capture the nuances of gender attitudes (Humlum et al. (2017)), an issue
that is specially worrisome in the case of Scandinavian countries were historically high female participation in the labor
market might be a weak signal of gender norms.
12As women’s presence in higher education becomes normal, less female students might regard themselves as exceptional
women or pioneers and they will be less likely to opt for male-dominated fields (Charles and Bradley, 2009). On the contrary,
if vertical and horizontal gender ascription move together according to common social conditions (England and Li (2006)),
women’s representation in higher education and field segregation should be positively related.
13For the sake of consistency, all the gender gaps in this paper are computed by the ratio of female to males.
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al (2014). The authors develop a new methodology to combine the math and science scores by the
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study (TIMSS). Whenever possible, Altinok et al. database focuses on math scores, although
takes into account growth rates of scores in science for countries which did not took part to an evaluation
in maths.
4 Empirical Results
I estimate the model in (3) using the within-group estimator. Breusch and Pagan post-estimation test
confirms the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity in the data. Therefore, I relax the usual require-
ment of independently distributed residuals. I employ cluster standard errors at country-level to allow
residuals to be correlated within but uncorrelated between countries (Cameron and Miller (2015)). Haus-
man test’ initial hypothesis -that the individual-level effects are adequately modeled by a random-effects
model- is resoundingly rejected.
Among other post-estimation tests, I take issue of outliers by identifying observations with very large
leverage or squared residuals. To do so, I re-estimate the fixed-effects models using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) with country and time fixed-effects and employ the lvr2plot Stata command to graphi-
cally identify and analyze separately high leverage observations (Cox, 2004). Finally, a potential caveat
on the validity of the estimation regards the relationship between the dissimilarity index and the share of
graduate females in higher education. Employing the Two Step Least Squared (2SLS) and the number of
women in parliaments to instrument the share of female graduates (see Stockemer and Byrne (2011) for a
justification of this instrument), corroborate the main results of the paper. Indeed, post-estimation tests
of the 2SLS approach fail to reject the hypothesis that the share of females graduates is an exogenous
covariate.
Column 1 in Table 2 provides results on the control variables and serve to review extant empirical works
on horizontal gender segregation. Population density (Pop density) is associated with a positive and
significant coefficient once cultural values are controlled. The share of employees (% Employees) and
service sector (% Serv. Economy) are associated with positive coefficients, although the latter is not
significant. The sign of these covariates go in line with previous literature on the segregative effects of
rising service sectors and economic modernity (Ma (2009), Charles (2011)). The coefficient associated
with % Prof Fem is consistent with the finding of Ramirez and Wotipka (2001) on the integrative effect
of upgrading female status in the labor market.
The size of the graduate body to total population (Size Grads) is not significantly associated with segrega-
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tion, whereas the breadth of vocational education (Diversification) is positively related with segregation,
as in Hillmert (2015). The result on the share of graduates who are females (% Graduates Fem) is consis-
tent with England and Li (2006) on that female participation and intergration across fields of study are
positively related. The academic performance gap between females and males in math and science (Score
gap) is associated with a strong, positive coefficient: female out-performance in secondary education is
associated with higher levels of segregation14.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Cultural Values:
Column 2 (Table 2) shows estimates on cultural values. % Disagree Men First has a negative and sig-
nificant coefficient, suggesting that gender-egalitarian views of gender roles in the labor market might
be negatively related with horizontal gender segregation. Pro-choice attitudes of the overall population
are not statistically significant. % God Important is negative and significantly related with segregation.
This result is inconsistent with the prediction that more religiosity enacts a traditional role of women in
the society (Algan and Cahuc (2006)). However, this finding can support previous evidence on the link
between religiosity and higher income per capita and economic growth (Guiso et al. (2003)15. A tentative
interpretation of this striking result is that religious societies promote a more traditional participation
of females in the labor market. Therefore, religion may promote less segregated higher education choice
through enacting a consumption-based acquisition of education by women. Women might be encouraged
to choose male-dominated fields of study in religious societies because they will, later in their life-time,
play a traditional role in the labor market. It is beyond the scope of the current paper to push further
the results associated with religion16.
Following Fortin (2005), Columns 3 and 4 consider separately female and male cultural values, respec-
tively. It turns out that female attitudes towards the three cultural features here tested -% Disagree Men
First, % Pro-Choice and % God Important- are statistically related with gender segregation. However,
in the case of male attitudes, only % God Important is statistically significant. This result might show
that behavioral choices of women rather than that of men drive segregation. As suggested in England
14Using Altinok et al. (2014) database allows for including 285 observations whereas using PISA data the number of
observations shrinks to 121. Models using PISA do not substantially modify the main results. These models are available
form the author upon request.
15See further insights in the religion effect in Esping-Andersen (1999), Algan and Cahuc (2006)
16I specify supplementary models to delve deeper into this effect. I analyze in a cross-country setting with information of
religion ascription in 1997 provided in Hall and Jones (1999). The main results of the paper remain in these specifications
and are available upon request.
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and Li (2006), it seems that women are more likely to engage in male-dominated fields that men in
female-dominated fields.
Pro-choice attitudes of females are weakly and negatively associated with horizontal gender segregation.
This potential correlation might corroborate the arguments of Goldin (2006) regarding more serious en-
gagement in education as women have more discretion over reproduction decisions. This results might
also go in line with recent research on a positive mechanism between abortion laws and educational in-
vestments (Gonza´lez et al. (2018)).
Due to this different effects of female and male’s attitudes on segregation, Column 5 includes the female
to male ratio of the three cultural values measured in the current analysis -% Disagree Men First, %
Pro-Choice and % God Important-, to study whether the distance between female and male attitudes
matters to segregation. These gaps seem to lack of explanatory power over segregation. Both female
and male considerations on religion are statistically significant and associated with a reducing effect on
segregation.
To summarize the resutls so far, the estimates suggest that gender-egalitarian attitudes and religion
display significant negative associations with horizontal gender segregation. The result regarding % Dis-
agree Men First aligns perfectly with the findings in Fortin (2005) in the context of female labor market
participation17.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
Marriage market effects:
Column 1 in Table 3 associates divorce rates with a positive and statistically significant coefficient, and
fertility, which is negative and not significant. Columns 2 and 3 include the average age at first marriage
of women and men, respectively. Both variables seem to have similar a association with segregation,
although male average age at first marriage is slightly less significant. A tentative explanation of this
finding might go along the lines of Badgett and Folbre (2003), who find that women and men are penal-
ized in the marriage market for non-gender-conforming behavior.
To dig deeper on individual family choices, I explore the effects of the age of motherhood (Age mum,
OECD Family Database). Likewise increasing the age at first marriage, Age mum is associated with a
segregative and significant effect. However, this variable do not identify exactly the age at first child, and
might not identify when exactly a female mother face a potential interruption of her educational career.
Due to this caveat, Column 4 includes the age of first marriage instead age of motherhood, along with
17Note that Fortin (2005) employs the proportion of respondents who agree on the statement ”scarce jobs should go to
men first” and finds a negative association with the employment status of women.
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the previous cultural values of females (% Disagree Men First (fem), % Pro-Choice (fem) and % God
Important (fem)). The estimates of this model suggest that increasing the age at first marriage display
significant positive associations with gender segregation, as well as confirms the above findings on cultural
values.
Family-Friendly Policies:
Columns 1 to 4 (Table 4) show estimates of the four different family-friendly policies, along with cul-
tural values and marriage market. Family policies refers in Columns 1 to 4 respectively to total parental
leave, length of maternity leave, parental leave with job protection and father-specific paid leave (Paid
Father). None of these policies are significantly associated with horizontal gender segregation. Nonethe-
less, parental leave with job protection and length of maternity leave have a positive coefficient, whereas
father-specific paid leave and total parental leave have a negative one.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
Columns 5 to 8 (Table 4) test for a potential interplay between family-friendly policies and gender-
egalitarian cultural values in horizontal gender segregation. This conjecture is expressed by the interaction
between family policies and females’ attitudes ( Family Policies * % Disagree Men First (fem)), in which
all the considerations on interactive models in Brambor et al (2006) are assured in the specification.
Out of the four family-friendly policies, only father-specific policies (Paid Father) and its interaction
with females’ attitudes (β3) are significant. Therefore, the marginal effect of each of the constitutive
terms hinges upon the levels of the other term. Appendix B Table B1 provides the marginal effects of
the paid father family policy in segregation at various levels of the gender-egalitarism (% Disagree Men
First (fem)). As females’ attitudes become more gender-egalitarian, measured in terms of higher levels
of % Disagree Men First (fem), family policies are negatively related with segregation. More specifically,
when females’ attitudes are below a 60% (% Disagree Men First (fem)), father-specific family policies are
positively related with gender segregation. However, when females’ attitudes are above this threshold,
this correlation becomes negative. For instance, when % Disagree Men First (fem) is equal to 60%, the
estimate point would imply that a 1 standard deviation increase in the family policy might decrease
segregation about 0.6 standard deviations. Nevertheless, these results should be accurately considered as
partial correlations.
Figure 4 plots the marginal effects of one additional week of paid leave for fathers. The y-axis corresponds
to the marginal effect of Paid Father in segregation, whereas the x-axis is the level of % Disagree Men First
(fem). As the x-axis variable increases, the potential marginal effect of Paid Father reduces and turns out
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Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Family Policies (ID)
to be negative. The confidence intervals at 95% reveal that the interaction is not statistically significant for
values between 40%- 60% of the variable of gender-egalitarian females’ attitudes. Nonetheless, existing
studies on the effects of family policies on female employment pinpoint that cross-country estimates
generally differ from those at micro-level (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017). Thus, the validity of these
results at a micro-level should be interpreted with extreme caution.
4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
I check the validity of the results using alternative estimation techniques, specifications and measures
of country-level segregation. First, I exploit the cross-country variation of cultural values and family
decision-making. The within-group technique employed in previous estimations is the most appropriate
for the purpose of this analysis, since it allows for controlling for unobserved idiosyncrasy that might
drive gender segregation. However, I test here whether the above fixed-effects results hold when focusing
on cross-country differences in segregation rather than within-country segregation. Pooled OLS esti-
mates corroborate the explanatory power of the covariates when including country fixed effects, as well
as country-time fixed effects (Table B2, Appendix B).
As another robustness check, I employ the IP index (Karmel and MacLachlan, 1988) as an alternative
measure of gender segregation at country-level (Columns 2-5 of Table B2, Appendix B). Using this alter-
native index of segregation, the coefficients associated to the main explanatory variables and controls are
similar to the previous results. These alternative specifications and estimation techniques are conclusive
on that cultural values, marriage market and family policies might be related with gender segregation in
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higher education.
4.2 Field-of-Study Segregation
The last step of this paper studies the relationship between cultural values and family decision-making and
field-specific levels of segregation. The empirical strategy in equation (5) uses as dependent variable the
association index (Aict) of each field i, in country c in year t. Recall that positive values of the association
index (Aict) mean female over-representation of the field, negative values mean male over-representation
and values close to zero mean gender neutrality. As we saw in Section 2, the feminized fields are education,
humanities and health and welfare, whereas masculinized fields are engineering, science and agriculture.
Services and social science are to a varying degree gender neutral. The interpretation of the coefficients
associated with the regressors entails a sly examination: it should consider before-hand whether the field
at stake in the left-hand-side (Aict) is a female-dominated or male-dominated. That is, the which field is
(Aict) computed for how each field is historically gender-labeled. Positive coefficients associated with the
explanatory values in feminized fields would mean a positive relation with gender segregation so long as
it means a perpetuation of females in female-dominated fields. Negative values of the same coefficients
would mean a negative relation between the regressor and gender segregation. Considering masculinized
fields, positive values associated with the regressors would mean a negative correlation with segregation,
whereas negative values would mean a positive correlation with segregation.
To alleviate potential omitted variables bias issues, I include the share of graduates in each field of
study to the overall graduate body in the set of control variables (FieldWeightict). However, data
availability at field-of-study level is scarce, which limitates the accuracy of the estimation and ultimately
the interpretation of the following results18.
Aict = β0 + β1%DisagreeMenFirst(fem)ct + β2PaidFatherct+
+ β3%DisagreeMenFirst(fem) ∗ PaidFatherct + CV ′ctβ +MM ′ctβ
+ FieldWeightct +X
′
ctβ + γt + αc + uct
i = field; c = country; t = year (5)
where Aict is the gender association of field i in country c and year t, γt are time fixed-effects, αc is the id-
iosyncratic term of countries. The main explanatory variables in this model are females’ attitudes towards
18Available from the author are OLS estimations using field-specific index of segregation as dependent variable (association
index) and controlling for time-invariant dummies, such as tuition fee discrimination across fields, early tracking as suggested
in Hanushek and W o¨ßmann (2006), funding scheme model for tertiary education, inter alia other institutional features.
The main results of the paper remain in these alternative models.
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gender roles in the labor market (%DisagreeMenFirst(fem)ct), family-friendly policies (PaidFatherct)
and their interaction. CVct and MMct are the set of cultural values (reproductive rigths and religion)
and marriage market and Xct the previous set of control variables.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
Table 5 shows within-group estimates of the field-specific model, where Columns 1-9 refer to each of the
field of higher education. I place special emphasis in the coefficients of the constitutive terms and the
interaction. These terms are statistically significant in the cases of humanities and arts (Column 2),
engineering (Column 5) and agriculture (Column 6). The marginal effects of father-specific leave in these
three fields of study are plotted in Figures 5 a), b) and c), that refer to the potential marginal effect of
one additional week of that policy (PaidFatherct) at different levels of females’ attitudes towards gender
roles in the labor market (%DisagreeMenFirst(fem)ct).
The sign of the coefficient of family-friendly policies is positive in the case of humanities, meaning that
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Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Paid Father (Aict)
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father-specific leaves might be related with a feminization of the field when female attitudes towards
gender roles are more traditional. As females’ attitudes become more gender-egalitarian, family friendly-
policies are related with less feminization of humanities and arts. In the case of engineering, PaidFatherct
is found to display a positive association with the masculinization of the field. However, as females’
attitudes become more gender-egalitarian, PaidFatherct is found to display a negative association with
the masculinization of the field.
The interaction is also significant in the case of agriculture (Column 6). Agriculture is male-dominated
in the sample of countries, although is less gender-labeled than the fields of humanities and arts and
engineering. The coefficient of PaidFatherct is positive and significant, meaning that family policies are
negatively related with gender segregation in agriculture. However, as gender-egalitarian attitudes of
females increase, family policies become positively related with gender segregation in agriculture.
Females’ attitudes towards reproductive rights do not seem to be significatively related with the gender-
labeling of fields. The previous country-level results of religion do not remain when considering field-
specific segregation in humanities and arts, but presist in the case of agriculture. Columns 2 and 6
(Table 5) estimate religion as significantly and positivelty related with feminization of humanities and
agriculture. To the contrary, religion is also positively related with higher feminization of agriculture, and
this, less segregation. The results at field-specific levels support the country-level estimates and pinpoint
to humanities and arts, engineering and agriculture as key fields of the potential drivers of segregation
in the total higher education. Ultimately, they provide suggestive evidence on a plausible relationship
between cultural values and family-friendly policies in horizontal gender segregation.
5 Conclusion
The persisting levels of gender segregation across fields of study in Western countries seem at odds with the
rise of female participation in higher education. This observation has worried social scientists over the last
decades, and it is particularly puzzling against the backdrop of affirmative action and anti-discrimination
policies, the triumph of gender-egalitarian ideals and economic development in OECD countries. Exist-
ing literature has emphasized individual gender gaps -preferences and aspirations, foreseeing of family
obligations- and external factors -economic structure, discrimination-, which imply increasing or decreas-
ing effects in horizontal gender segregation. This paper complements extant works by focusing on cultural
values and family decision-making as potential determinants of gender segregation across fields of study
in advanced economies.
I propose panel data econometric models to study the relationship between cultural values, the marriage
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market and family-friendly policies with horizontal gender segregation. I employ four waves of the World
Value Survey (WVS) to proxy three dimensions of culture and consider their potential effect in gender
segregation across fields of study. Egalitarian attitudes towards gender roles in the labor market, mea-
sured by the disagreement with the statement ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to
a job than women”, are found to be negatively associated with gender segregation in higher education.
Strikingly, more religiosity, measured as the proportion of WVS respondents how state that ”God is
very important in their lives”, is also negatively associated with gender segregation. Favorable attitudes
towards reproductive rights, measured by the agreement with ”Abortion is always justifiable”, are con-
sidered in the analysis but do not found a robust association with gender segregation. The main results
suggest that cultural females’ attitudes might play a role in gender segregation, whereas males attitudes
are not found to be significant.
Finally, the estimates uncover a significant association between family-friendly policies and gender seg-
regation that is contingent upon gender-egalitarian attitudes of females. Family-friendly policies are
associated with an integrative effect in higher education in societies above a certain level of females’
attitudes towards gender roles in the labor market. However, the same policies are positively related
with segregation in less gender-egalitarian countries. Focusing on field-specific segregation measures, the
results suggest that country-level results might be driven by the fields of humanities and arts, engineering
and agriculture. Both country and field-of-study levels results consistently suggest a potential interplay
between cultural values and family policies on gender segregation in higher education.
To conclude, it should be stressed that these findings are based on macro-level data. The results of
family-friendly policies in segregation provided here contrast to the lack of explanatory power of the
exact same policies in labor market outcomes in previous studies (Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017)). There
are potential mechanisms driving horizontal gender segregation that cannot be controlled for, such as the
effect of socioeconomic status, educational attainment and gender-stereotyped labor market behavior of
parents or country of origin. Hence, an interesting topic for future research is to explore whether the
results here hold in micro-level contexts. This could be made by using cohort data that may enable us to
control for demographics and parental transmission of attitudes towards gender roles in the labor market.
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Table 2: Cultural Values
Dependent variable: Dissimilarity Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pop. density 0.111 0.231∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.159∗
(0.070) (0.058) (0.063) (0.063) (0.084)
% Employees 0.550∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.162) (0.167) (0.179) (0.198)
% Serv. Economy 0.069 0.078 0.102 0.081 0.166∗∗
(0.068) (0.105) (0.084) (0.116) (0.075)
% Prof. Female -0.231∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗ -0.420∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.080) (0.072) (0.091) (0.105)
Size Grads 2.893 2.428 2.558 2.174 3.376
(1.994) (2.048) (2.092) (2.210) (2.850)
Diversification 0.118∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026)
% Graduates Fem -0.114∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗ -0.105∗∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.032) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.041)
Score gap 91.006∗∗∗ 91.150∗∗∗ 93.661∗∗∗ 91.038∗∗∗ 91.634∗∗∗
(18.691) (26.324) (25.492) (27.380) (29.034)
% Disagree Men First -0.047∗
(0.023)
% Pro-Choice -0.083
(0.051)
% God Important -0.246∗∗∗
(0.057)
% Disagree Men First (fem) -0.074∗∗
(0.031)
% Pro-Choice (fem) -0.065∗
(0.034)
% God Important (fem) -0.248∗∗∗
(0.072)
% Disagree Men First (males) -0.035
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(0.036)
% Pro-Choice (males) -0.106
(0.074)
% God Important (males) -0.190∗∗∗
(0.058)
% Disagree Men First (gap) 0.749
(4.377)
% Pro-Choice (gap) 0.083
(2.351)
% God Important (gap) 0.708
(0.578)
Constant -111.433∗∗∗ -109.891∗∗∗ -111.545∗∗∗ -113.050∗∗∗ -132.195∗∗∗
(29.851) (32.939) (32.644) (33.435) (31.579)
N 278 181 181 181 181
R2 0.404 0.558 0.554 0.542 0.502
No. of Groups 26 18 18 18 18
log-likelihood -541.013 -295.157 -296.120 -298.440 -306.058
Within R-squared 0.404 0.558 0.554 0.542 0.502
Between R-squared 0.006 0.026 0.029 0.024 0.026
Overall R-squared 0.014 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.017
Clustered standard errors in parentheses at country-level
Time fixed-effects included in all the models but not reported
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3: Marriage Market
Dependent variable: Dissimilarity Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Divorce rate 1.417∗∗ 1.235∗ 1.178∗ 1.715∗∗∗ 0.693
(0.614) (0.640) (0.622) (0.557) (0.518)
Fertility -1.854 -2.508 -2.456 0.011 -2.087
(1.860) (1.737) (1.621) (1.739) (1.933)
Pop. density 0.106 0.110 0.111 0.135∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
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(0.064) (0.069) (0.066) (0.057) (0.070)
% Employees 0.532∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.187) (0.184) (0.175) (0.142)
% Serv. Economy 0.046 -0.001 -0.002 0.077 0.039
(0.063) (0.070) (0.071) (0.058) (0.078)
% Prof. Female -0.251∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.071) (0.068) (0.068) (0.085)
Size Grads 3.046 2.746 2.821 1.955 2.300
(1.882) (1.700) (1.699) (1.708) (2.170)
Diversification 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
% Graduates Fem -0.118∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.035)
Score gap 87.117∗∗∗ 85.885∗∗∗ 85.247∗∗∗ 73.614∗∗∗ 90.617∗∗∗
(20.126) (19.552) (18.654) (19.884) (28.189)
Marri age (fem) 0.976∗ 0.678∗∗
(0.495) (0.246)
Marri age (males) 1.052∗
(0.537)
Age mum 2.005∗∗
(0.885)
% Disagree Men First (fem) -0.108∗∗
(0.048)
% Pro-Choice (fem) -0.061∗
(0.035)
% God Important (fem) -0.271∗∗
(0.105)
Constant -102.784∗∗∗ -124.711∗∗∗ -128.825∗∗∗ -155.863∗∗∗ -121.719∗∗∗
(30.944) (35.268) (34.542) (31.823) (34.098)
N 271 255 255 266 168
R2 0.425 0.456 0.466 0.443 0.585
No. of Groups 26 26 26 26.000 18
log-likelihood -523.144 -485.698 -483.459 -508.627 -269.830
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Within R-squared 0.425 0.456 0.466 0.443 0.585
Between R-squared 0.009 0.020 0.021 0.008 0.044
Overall R-squared 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.007 0.013
Clustered standard errors in parentheses at country-level
Time fixed-effects included in all the models but not reported
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 4: Family Policies
Dependent variable: Dissimilarity Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPL LML PLJP Paid Father TPL LML PLJP Paid Father
Family Policy 0.006 -0.061 0.060 -0.014 0.014 -0.372 0.118 0.109∗∗
(0.011) (0.098) (0.042) (0.025) (0.049) (0.048) (0.263) (0.119)
Family Policy -0.000 0.006 -0.001 -0.002∗∗
*%Disagree Men First (fem) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
% Disagree Men First (fem) -0.110∗∗ -0.105∗∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.109∗∗ -0.090 -0.241 -0.007 -0.106∗∗
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.049) (0.157) (0.154) (0.202) (0.049)
% Pro-choice (fem) -0.067∗ -0.056 -0.052 -0.058 -0.070∗ -0.068 -0.060∗ -0.059
(0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) (0.039) (0.041) (0.031) (0.034)
% God Important (fem) -0.273∗∗ -0.263∗∗ -0.244∗∗ -0.276∗∗ -0.268∗∗ -0.278∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗
(0.105) (0.107) (0.105) (0.107) (0.122) (0.122) (0.084) (0.107)
Divorce rate 0.684 0.652 0.760 0.638 0.628 0.800 0.833 0.663
(0.518) (0.478) (0.521) (0.521) (0.615) (0.474) (0.554) (0.527)
Marri Age (fem) 0.686∗∗ 0.673∗∗ 0.676∗∗ 0.670∗∗ 0.703∗∗ 0.597∗ 0.727∗∗ 0.556∗∗
(0.255) (0.237) (0.259) (0.250) (0.289) (0.292) (0.299) (0.244)
Fertility -1.666 -1.980 -2.294 -2.177 -1.576 -2.701 -2.204 -1.590
(2.292) (1.929) (2.009) (1.931) (2.431) (2.199) (1.967) (2.020)
Pop. density 0.213∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗
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(0.070) (0.061) (0.069) (0.076) (0.073) (0.066) (0.068) (0.079)
% Employees 0.599∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.156) (0.142) (0.142) (0.151) (0.154) (0.142) (0.140)
% Serv. Economy 0.052 0.027 0.071 0.042 0.043 0.029 0.083 0.000
(0.075) (0.083) (0.084) (0.076) (0.062) (0.083) (0.090) (0.072)
% Prof. Female -0.401∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.089) (0.084) (0.088) (0.085) (0.082) (0.086) (0.088)
Size Grads 2.297 2.428 2.381 2.245 2.249 2.216 2.320 2.057
(2.187) (2.268) (2.187) (2.197) (2.259) (2.243) (2.229) (2.206)
Diversification 0.100∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
% Graduates Fem -0.108∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034)
Score gap 89.640∗∗∗ 90.675∗∗∗ 97.347∗∗∗ 90.862∗∗∗ 89.783∗∗∗ 94.131∗∗∗ 98.495∗∗∗ 84.503∗∗∗
(28.025) (28.296) (27.591) (28.250) (28.456) (27.419) (28.749) (28.918)
Constant -121.062∗∗∗ -123.568∗∗∗ -137.984∗∗∗ -122.388∗∗∗ -121.398∗∗∗ -117.457∗∗∗ -147.667∗∗∗ -106.193∗∗∗
(33.245) (33.601) (33.702) (34.303) (34.249) (34.799) (45.265) (33.546)
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
R2 0.586 0.586 0.591 0.586 0.586 0.591 0.592 0.595
No. of Groups 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
log-likelihood -269.649 -269.602 -268.622 -269.662 -269.615 -268.585 -268.350 -267.803
Within R-squared 0.586 0.586 0.591 0.586 0.586 0.591 0.592 0.595
Between R-squared 0.048 0.040 0.073 0.041 0.049 0.032 0.087 0.038
Overall R-squared 0.015 0.011 0.024 0.011 0.016 0.007 0.029 0.010
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Clustered standard errors in parentheses at country-level
Time fixed-effects included in all the models but not reported
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
33
Table 5: Association Index and Paid Father
Dependent variable: Association Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Educ Hum & Arts Soc. Sci Science Eng. Agri. Health Serv NKOU
Paid Father 0.002 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.003 -0.008∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.002 0.000 0.091
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.235)
% Disagree Men First (fem) -0.113 0.410∗ -0.432 -1.108∗∗ -0.482 2.657∗ 0.144 1.061∗ 12.850∗∗
(1.017) (0.222) (0.474) (0.496) (0.930) (1.268) (0.795) (0.601) (4.476)
Paid Father * % Disagree Men First (fem) -0.003 -0.008∗ -0.006 -0.003 0.013∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.002 -0.007 -0.081
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.313)
% Pro-Choice (fem) -0.023 0.448 -0.172 -0.690 1.036 1.764 -0.656 -2.200 2.534
(1.330) (0.343) (0.513) (1.020) (0.861) (1.141) (0.910) (1.269) (8.719)
% God Important (fem) -1.228 0.624∗∗ -0.390 0.648 -0.892 2.558∗∗ -0.566 -0.140 41.636
(1.111) (0.277) (0.366) (0.528) (0.870) (1.190) (0.732) (0.479) (32.819)
Divorce rate -0.050 -0.025 -0.039 0.054 0.017 -0.175∗ -0.064 0.057 -0.130
(0.058) (0.023) (0.028) (0.050) (0.043) (0.093) (0.039) (0.062) (0.227)
Marri Age (fem) -0.225∗∗ 0.032 -0.037 -0.060 -0.077 -0.085 -0.022 0.132∗ -0.141
(0.100) (0.058) (0.040) (0.048) (0.075) (0.108) (0.036) (0.068) (0.776)
Fertility 0.390∗ -0.085 0.077 0.202∗ 0.599∗∗ -0.041 -0.057 -0.589∗∗ -0.815
(0.215) (0.083) (0.068) (0.099) (0.209) (0.251) (0.146) (0.211) (4.210)
Field weight -5.620∗∗ 0.944 -0.881 1.117 1.125 -22.700∗ 1.424 -6.167∗ 16.492
(2.416) (0.706) (0.994) (1.682) (1.703) (10.961) (1.655) (2.993) (13.884)
Pop. density 0.009 -0.004 0.005 -0.025∗∗∗ 0.006 0.022 -0.012∗∗ 0.012 0.031
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(0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.011) (0.039)
% Employees 0.056∗ -0.001 0.001 0.006 0.019 -0.063 0.009 -0.031 0.047
(0.027) (0.012) (0.016) (0.027) (0.026) (0.042) (0.015) (0.022) (0.297)
% Serv. Economy 0.028∗∗ -0.000 0.001 -0.011 0.012 -0.034∗∗ -0.003 -0.010 0.088∗∗
(0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.039)
% Prof. Female -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.026∗∗ 0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -0.025 0.099
(0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.016) (0.111)
Size Grads -0.782 0.095 -0.132 0.321∗ -0.065 0.455 0.053 -0.439∗∗ 1.507
(0.509) (0.137) (0.154) (0.171) (0.116) (0.298) (0.243) (0.183) (1.324)
Diversification 0.005 -0.001 0.005∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.008∗∗ -0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.015
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.017)
% Graduates Fem 0.020 -0.006 0.010 -0.016 -0.003 -0.021 -0.015 -0.005 0.063
(0.021) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.017) (0.034) (0.016) (0.018) (0.067)
Score gaps 0.182 0.549 1.023 -5.176∗∗ -2.080 2.627 1.711 8.581∗∗∗ -10.853
(2.165) (1.059) (1.602) (1.784) (2.261) (3.281) (1.183) (2.871) (14.024)
Constant -0.714 -0.371 -0.746 10.068∗∗∗ -0.792 2.768 1.970 -8.492∗ -27.672
(5.227) (2.704) (2.659) (2.781) (5.009) (4.275) (2.909) (4.452) (36.525)
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 51
R2 0.604 0.495 0.501 0.614 0.527 0.552 0.530 0.593 0.692
No. of Groups 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 11
log-likelihood 111.779 192.826 185.290 134.942 154.095 97.953 157.390 128.076 23.475
Within R-squared 0.604 0.495 0.501 0.614 0.527 0.552 0.530 0.593 0.692
Between R-squared 0.171 0.090 0.182 0.061 0.017 0.016 0.137 0.000 0.108
Overall R-squared 0.092 0.144 0.215 0.011 0.002 0.040 0.175 0.007 0.144
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Clustered standard errors in parentheses at country-field level
Time fixed-effects included in all the models but not reported
Educ (Education); Hum & Arts (Humanities and Arts); Soc. Sci (Social Science); Eng. (Engineering, manufacturing and construction); Agri. (Agriculture)
Health (Health and Welfare); Serv (Services); NKOU (Not known or unespecified)
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
36
References
Akerlof, G. A. and Kranton, R. E. (2000). Economics and identity. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115(3):715–753.
Albrecht, J., Bjo¨rklund, A., and Vroman, S. (2003). Is there a glass ceiling in sweden? Journal of Labor
economics, 21(1):145–177.
Alesina, A., Giuliano, P., and Nunn, N. (2011). Fertility and the plough. American Economic Review,
101(3):499–503.
Algan, Y. and Cahuc, P. (2006). Job protection: The macho hypothesis. Oxford Review of Economic
Policy, 22(3):390–410.
Alonso-Villar, O., Del Rio, C., and Grad´ın, C. (2012). The extent of occupational segregation in the
united states: Differences by race, ethnicity, and gender. Industrial relations: a journal of economy
and society, 51(2):179–212.
Altinok, N., Diebolt, C., and Demeulemeester, J.-L. (2014). A new international database on education
quality: 1965–2010. Applied Economics, 46(11):1212–1247.
Altonji, J. G. and Blank, R. M. (1999). Race and gender in the labor market. Handbook of labor
economics, 3:3143–3259.
Altonji, J. G., Huang, C.-I., and Taber, C. R. (2015). Estimating the cream skimming effect of school
choice. Journal of Political Economy, 123(2):266–324.
Andersson, R. and Olsson, A.-K. (1999). Fields of education and training manual. Manual for ISCED,
97.
Attanasio, O. P. and Kaufmann, K. M. (2017). Education choices and returns on the labor and marriage
markets: Evidence from data on subjective expectations. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-
tion, 140:35–55.
Azmat, G., Gu¨ell, M., and Manning, A. (2006). Gender gaps in unemployment rates in oecd countries.
Journal of Labor Economics, 24(1):1–37.
Badgett, L. and Folbre, N. (2003). Job gendering: Occupational choice and the marriage market. Indus-
trial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 42(2):270–298.
37
Badgett, M. and Folbre, N. (1999). Assigning care: Gender norms and economic outcomes. International
Labour Review, 138(3):311–326.
Bailey, M. J. and Dynarski, S. M. (2011). Gains and gaps: Changing inequality in us college entry and
completion. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Barone, C. (2011). Some things never change: Gender segregation in higher education across eight nations
and three decades. Sociology of Education, 84(2):157–176.
Becker, G. S. (1957). The economics of discrimination: an economic view of racial discrimination.
University of Chicago.
Becker, G. S. (1991). A treatise on the family. cambridge, massachusetts and london, england.
Be´nabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2007). Identity, dignity and taboos: Beliefs as assets.
Bettio, F., Verashchagina, A., Mairhuber, I., and Kanjuo-Mrcˇela, A. (2009). Gender segregation in the
labour market: Root causes, implications and policy responses in the EU. Publications Office of the
European Union Luxembourg.
Blau, F. D., Brinton, M. C., and Grusky, D. B. (2006). The declining significance of gender? Russell
Sage Foundation.
Blau, F. D., Brummund, P., and Liu, A. Y.-H. (2013). Trends in occupational segregation by gender
1970–2009: Adjusting for the impact of changes in the occupational coding system. Demography,
50(2):471–492.
Blossfeld, H.-P., Skopek, J., Triventi, M., and Buchholz, S. (2015). Gender, education and employment:
an international comparison of school-to-work transitions. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Bobbitt-Zeher, D. (2007). The gender income gap and the role of education. Sociology of education,
80(1):1–22.
Bronson, M. A. (2014). Degrees are forever: Marriage, educational investment, and lifecycle labor deci-
sions of men and women. Unpublished manuscript, 2.
Brown, C. and Corcoran, M. (1997). Sex-based differences in school content and the male-female wage
gap. Journal of Labor Economics, 15(3):431–465.
Brunello, G. and Checchi, D. (2007). Does school tracking affect equality of opportunity? new interna-
tional evidence. Economic policy, 22(52):782–861.
38
Buser, T., Niederle, M., and Oosterbeek, H. (2014). Gender, competitiveness, and career choices. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(3):1409–1447.
Cameron, A. C. and Miller, D. L. (2015). A practitioners guide to cluster-robust inference. Journal of
Human Resources, 50(2):317–372.
Card, D. and Payne, A. A. (2017). High school choices and the gender gap in stem. Technical report,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Carlsson, M. (2011). Does hiring discrimination cause gender segregation in the swedish labor market?
Feminist Economics, 17(3):71–102.
Castles, F. G. and Marceau, J. (1989). The transformation in gender inequality in tertiary education.
Journal of Public Policy, 9(4):493–507.
Ceci, S. J. and Williams, W. M. (2010). Sex differences in math-intensive fields. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 19(5):275–279.
Ceci, S. J. and Williams, W. M. (2015). Why so few women in mathematically intensive fields? Emerging
Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource.
Charles, M. (2011). What gender is science? Contexts, 10(2):22–28.
Charles, M. and Bradley, K. (2002). Equal but separate? a cross-national study of sex segregation in
higher education. American Sociological Review, pages 573–599.
Charles, M. and Bradley, K. (2009). Indulging our gendered selves? sex segregation by field of study in
44 countries. American journal of sociology, 114(4):924–976.
Charles, M., Ellis, C., and England, P. (2015). Is there a caring class? intergenerational transmission of
care work. Sociological Science, 2:527–543.
Charles, M. and Grusky, D. B. (1995). Models for describing the underlying structure of sex segregation.
American Journal of Sociology, 100(4):931–971.
Chiappori, P.-A., Iyigun, M., and Weiss, Y. (2009). Investment in schooling and the marriage market.
American Economic Review, 99(5):1689–1713.
Croson, R. and Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic literature,
47(2):448–74.
39
Dollar, D. and Gatti, R. (1999). Gender inequality, income, and growth: are good times good for women?,
volume 1.
Duncan, O. D. and Duncan, B. (1955). A methodological analysis of segregation indexes. American
sociological review, 20(2):210–217.
Eccles, J. S. and Jacobs, J. E. (1986). Social forces shape math attitudes and performance. Signs: Journal
of women in culture and society, 11(2):367–380.
EIGE (2014). A new method to understand occupational gender segregation in european labour markets.
European Commission.
Ellingsæter, A. L. (2013). Scandinavian welfare states and gender (de) segregation: Recent trends and
processes. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 34(3):501–518.
England, P. (2010). The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled. Gender & Society, 24(2):149–166.
England, P. (2011). Reassessing the uneven gender revolution and its slowdown. Gender & Society,
25(1):113–123.
England, P. and Li, S. (2006). Desegregation stalled: The changing gender composition of college majors,
1971-2002. Gender & Society, 20(5):657–677.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1999). Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford University Press.
Estevez-Abe, M. (2005). Gender bias in skills and social policies: The varieties of capitalism perspective
on sex segregation. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 12(2):180–215.
Evertsson, M., England, P., Mooi-Reci, I., Hermsen, J., De Bruijn, J., and Cotter, D. (2009). Is gender
inequality greater at lower or higher educational levels? common patterns in the netherlands, sweden,
and the united states. Social Politics, 16(2):210–241.
Farre´, L. and Vella, F. (2013). The intergenerational transmission of gender role attitudes and its impli-
cations for female labour force participation. Economica, 80(318):219–247.
Ferna´ndez, R. (2011). Does culture matter? In Handbook of social economics, volume 1, pages 481–510.
Elsevier.
Ferna´ndez, R. (2013). Cultural change as learning: The evolution of female labor force participation over
a century. American Economic Review, 103(1):472–500.
40
Ferna´ndez, R., Fogli, A., and Olivetti, C. (2004). Mothers and sons: Preference formation and female
labor force dynamics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4):1249–1299.
Folbre, N. (1994). Who pays for the kids?: gender and the structures of constraint, volume 4. Taylor &
Francis US.
Fortin, N. M. (2005). Gender role attitudes and the labour-market outcomes of women across oecd
countries. oxford review of Economic Policy, 21(3):416–438.
Gelbgiser, D. and Albert, K. (2017). Green for all? gender segregation and green fields of study in
american higher education. Social Problems.
Goldin, C. (1990). The gender gap: An economic history of american women. Cambridge UniversityPress,
New York, Estados Unidos.
Goldin, C. (2006). The quiet revolution that transformed women’s employment, education, and family.
American economic review, 96(2):1–21.
Goldin, C. and Katz, L. F. (2002). The power of the pill: Oral contraceptives and womens career and
marriage decisions. Journal of political Economy, 110(4):730–770.
Gonza´lez, L., Jime´nez-Mart´ın, S., Nollenberger, N., Castello, J. V., et al. (2018). The effect of abortion
legalization on fertility, marriage and long-term outcomes for women. Technical report.
Guiso, L., Monte, F., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2008). Culture, gender, and math. SCIENCE-NEW
YORK THEN WASHINGTON-, 320(5880):1164.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2003). People’s opium? religion and economic attitudes. Journal
of monetary economics, 50(1):225–282.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2006). Does culture affect economic outcomes? Journal of
Economic perspectives, 20(2):23–48.
Hall, R. E. and Jones, C. I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker
than others? The quarterly journal of economics, 114(1):83–116.
Hanushek, E. A. and W o¨ßmann, L. (2006). Does educational tracking affect performance and inequality?
differences-in-differences evidence across countries. The Economic Journal, 116(510):C63–C76.
Hillmert, S. (2015). Gender segregation in occupational expectations and in the labour market: Interna-
tional variation and the role of education and training systems. In Gender Segregation in Vocational
Education, pages 123–148. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
41
Humlum, M. K., Kleinjans, K. J., and Nielsen, H. S. (2012). An economic analysis of identity and career
choice. Economic inquiry, 50(1):39–61.
Humlum, M. K., Nandrup, A., and Smith, N. (2017). Closing or reproducing the gender gap? parental
transmission, social norms and education choice.
Inglehart, R. F., Ponarin, E., and Inglehart, R. C. (2017). Cultural change, slow and fast: The distinctive
trajectory of norms governing gender equality and sexual orientation. Social Forces, 95(4):1313–1340.
Jaumotte, F. (2003). Female labour force participation: past trends and main determinants in oecd
countries.
Jaumotte, F. (2004). Labour force participation of women. OECD Economic studies, 2003(2):51–108.
Kahn, S. and Ginther, D. (2017). Women and stem. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Karmel, T. and Maclachlan, M. (1988). Occupational sex segregationincreasing or decreasing? Economic
Record, 64(3):187–195.
Klasen, S. and Lamanna, F. (2009). The impact of gender inequality in education and employment on
economic growth: new evidence for a panel of countries. Feminist economics, 15(3):91–132.
Knowles, S., Lorgelly, P. K., and Owen, P. D. (2002). Are educational gender gaps a brake on economic
development? some cross-country empirical evidence. Oxford economic papers, 54(1):118–149.
Ma, Y. (2009). Family socioeconomic status, parental involvement, and college major choicesgender,
race/ethnic, and nativity patterns. Sociological Perspectives, 52(2):211–234.
Mandel, H. and Semyonov, M. (2006). A welfare state paradox: State interventions and womens employ-
ment opportunities in 22 countries. American journal of sociology, 111(6):1910–1949.
Mann, A. and DiPrete, T. A. (2013). Trends in gender segregation in the choice of science and engineering
majors. Social science research, 42(6):1519–1541.
Mastekaasa, A. and Smeby, J.-C. (2008). Educational choice and persistence in male-and female-
dominated fields. Higher Education, 55(2):189–202.
Nelson, J. A. (2017). Gender and Risk-Taking: Economics, Evidence, and Why the Answer Matters,
volume 17. Taylor & Francis.
42
Ngai, L. R. and Petrongolo, B. (2017). Gender gaps and the rise of the service economy. American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9(4):1–44.
Nollenberger, N., Rodr´ıguez-Planas, N., and Sevilla, A. (2016). The math gender gap: The role of culture.
American Economic Review, 106(5):257–61.
OECD (2006). Women in scientific careers: Unleashing the potential. Organisation for Economic Coop-
eration and Development.
Olivetti, C. and Petrongolo, B. (2014). Gender gaps across countries and skills: Demand, supply and the
industry structure. Review of Economic Dynamics, 17(4):842–859.
Olivetti, C. and Petrongolo, B. (2016). The evolution of gender gaps in industrialized countries. Annual
review of Economics, 8:405–434.
Olivetti, C. and Petrongolo, B. (2017). The economic consequences of family policies: lessons from a
century of legislation in high-income countries. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(1):205–30.
Pepin, J. R. and Cotter, D. A. (2018). Separating spheres? diverging trends in youth’s gender attitudes
about work and family. Journal of Marriage and Family.
Polacheck, I. and Rosenberger, R. (1978). Distribution of autolysins in hyphae of aspergillus nidulans:
evidence for a lipid-mediated attachment to hyphal walls. Journal of bacteriology, 135(3):741–747.
Polachek, S. W. (1987). Occupational segregation and the gender wage gap. Population Research and
Policy Review, 6(1):47–67.
Ramirez, F. O. and Wotipka, C. M. (2001). Slowly but surely? the global expansion of women’s partici-
pation in science and engineering fields of study, 1972-92. Sociology of Education, pages 231–251.
Reskin, B. (1993). Sex segregation in the workplace. Annual review of sociology, 19(1):241–270.
Sassler, S., Michelmore, K., and Smith, K. (2017). A tale of two majors: explaining the gender gap in
stem employment among computer science and engineering degree holders. Social Sciences, 6(3):69.
Semyonov, M. and Jones, F. L. (1999). Dimensions of gender occupational differentiation in segregation
and inequality: A cross-national analysis. Social Indicators Research, 46(2):225–247.
Shavit, Y. et al. (2007). Stratification in higher education: A comparative study. Stanford University
Press.
43
SheFigures (2012). Gender in research and innovation. statistics and indicators. european commission.
Publications Office of the European Union.
Sikora, J. and Pokropek, A. (2012). Gender segregation of adolescent science career plans in 50 countries.
Science Education, 96(2):234–264.
Stockemer, D. and Byrne, M. (2011). Women’s representation around the world: the importance of
women’s participation in the workforce. Parliamentary Affairs, 65(4):802–821.
van de Werfhorst, H. G. (2017). Gender segregation across fields of study in post-secondary education:
Trends and social differentials. European Sociological Review, 33(3):449–464.
Watts, M. (1998). Occupational gender segregation: Index measureiient and econometric modeling.
Demography, 35(4):489–496.
Weichselbaumer, D. and Winter-Ebmer, R. (2005). A meta-analysis of the international gender wage
gap. Journal of Economic Surveys, 19(3):479–511.
Xie, Y. and Shauman, K. A. (1997). Modeling the sex-typing of occupational choice: Influences of
occupational structure. Sociological methods & research, 26(2):233–261.
Zafar, B. (2013). College major choice and the gender gap. Journal of Human Resources, 48(3):545–595.
44
Appendices
Appendix A
Table A1: ISCED 1997 1 digit-level
Code Field of Study
140 Education
200 Humanities and Arts
300 Social sciences, business and law
400 Science
500 Engineering, manufacturing and construction
600 Agriculture
700 Health and welfare
800 Services
990 Not known or unspecified
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Table A2: Sample Countries
Country Average ID index Baseline model WVS data Ass. Models Ass. Models (NKOU)
Austria 34.10 yes
Belgium 26.00 yes
Canada 24.39 yes yes yes yes
Czech Republic 31.98 yes yes
Denmark 35.23 yes
Finland 42.05 yes yes yes
France 31.15 yes yes yes
Germany 36.37 yes yes yes yes
Greece 26.60 yes
Hungary 26.36 yes yes yes
Iceland 32.37 yes
Ireland 27.46 yes
Italy 23.13 yes yes yes yes
Korea, Rep. 30.62 yes yes yes
Luxembourg 10.55 yes
Netherlands 31.14 yes yes yes yes
Norway 33.81 yes yes yes yes
Poland 20.22 yes yes yes yes
Portugal 27.95 yes
Slovak Republic 31.36 yes yes
Spain 30.41 yes yes yes yes
Sweden 34.20 yes yes yes yes
Switzerland 30.13 yes yes yes yes
Turkey 17.07 yes yes yes yes
United Kingdom 26.50 yes yes yes yes
United States 22.91 yes yes yes yes
Sample countries vary in models due to data requirements, first column provides dissimilarity index averages for countries in
baseline model (Column 1 Table 2), countries using WVS data. Ass models refer to the field-specific models using association
index for the first 8 ISCED1997 fields and for ”not known or unespecified (NKOU)”.
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Table A3: Data Sources
Variable Description Data Source
Dissimilarity Index Own computations of the index in Duncan and Duncan (1955)
based on ISCED1997 1 digit-level data on female and male
gratuates
OECD Educa-
tion Database
IP index Own computations of the index in Karmel and MacLachlan
(1988) based on ISCED1997 1 digit-level data on female and
male gratuates
”
Association Index Own computations of the indices in Charles and Grusky (1995)
based on ISCED1997 1 digit-level data on female and male
graduates
”
Population Density Number of people per square kilometer World Bank
data
% Employees Share of employees to total employment using the International
Classification of Status in Employment (ICSE-93)
ILO-
LABORSTA
% Service Economy Share of employment in service sector to total employment us-
ing the International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ISCO-88)
”
% Prof. Female Share of females in the occupational status of ”professionals”
(ISCO-88: group 2)
”
Size Grads Share of total graduates in higher education to total population
in percentages
OECD Educa-
tion Database,
World Bank
% Graduates Fem. Share of females in total graduates in higher education ILO-
LABORSTA
Score gap Female to male ratio of mean scores in PISA, TIMSS and
PIRLS international tests from Quality of Education Database
Altinok et al.
(2014)
% Disagree Men
First
Share of respondents who disagree on the statement”When jobs
are scarce, men should have more right on a job that women”
to total respondents
World Value
Survey (WVS)
% Pro-Choice Share of respondents who agree equal to 10 on a 0 to 10 scale
that”Abortion is always justifiable”
”
% God Important Share of respondents who say that”God is important in her
life” equal to 10 on a 0 to 10 scale that
”
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Table A4: Data Sources Explanatory Variables in Alternative Models (cont.)
Variable Description Data Source
Divorce rate Number of divorces during the year per 1,000 people OECD Family
Database
Marri. Age Fem. Average age of first marriage (females) ”
Marri. Age Male Average age of first marriage (males) ”
Age Mum Average age of mothers at childbirth ”
Fertility Total number of births per woman World Bank
TPL Total length of paid maternity and parental leave (weeks) OECD Em-
ployment
Database
LML Length of maternity leave (weeks) OECD Family
Database
Paid Father Length of paid father-specific leave (weeks) OECD Em-
ployment
Database
PLJP Length of parental leave with job protection (weeks) OECD Em-
ployment
Database
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Appendix B
Table B1: Average Marginal Effects of Paid Father at Different Levels of WVS
% Disagree Men First (fem) dy/dx robust s.e. z p-value
0 .11 .048 2.30 0.021
20 .062 .029 2.12 0.034
40 .015 .018 0.82 0.414
60 -.033 .025 -1.30 0.194
80 -.08 .043 -1.88 0.060
10 -.128 .062 -2.06 0.040
Marginal effects plotted in Figure 5
Sensitivity Check
Table B2: IP index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Depent variable: ID IP IP IP IP
Paid Father 0.109∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.051) (0.026)
% Disagree Men First (fem) -0.106∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028)
Paid Father * -0.002∗∗ -0.001∗∗
% Disagree Men First (fem) (0.001) (0.001)
% Pro-Choice (fem) -0.059 -0.048∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.047∗∗
(0.037) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021)
% God Important (fem) -0.274∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗ -0.127∗∗
(0.114) (0.036) (0.055) (0.059)
Divorce rate 0.663 0.415 0.384
(0.563) (0.278) (0.300)
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Marri Age (fem) 0.556∗∗ 0.233∗ 0.162
(0.261) (0.130) (0.139)
Fertility -1.590 -0.997 -0.730
(2.158) (1.059) (1.127)
Pop. density 0.215∗∗ 0.080∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.040) (0.035) (0.038) (0.046)
% Employees 0.561∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.127) (0.094) (0.083) (0.089)
% Serv. Economy 0.000 0.048 0.034 0.007 -0.014
(0.077) (0.036) (0.043) (0.038) (0.037)
% Prof. Female -0.396∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.035) (0.033) (0.038) (0.043)
Size Grads 2.057 0.642 0.564 0.430 0.259
(2.357) (1.099) (0.932) (0.939) (1.033)
Diversification 0.100∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015)
% Graduates Fem -0.113∗∗∗
(0.037)
Score gap 84.503∗∗ 44.324∗∗∗ 44.368∗∗∗ 43.817∗∗∗ 40.568∗∗∗
(30.898) (8.931) (12.002) (12.944) (14.080)
Constant -76.590∗∗ -63.676∗∗∗ -61.313∗∗∗ -64.848∗∗∗ -39.081∗∗∗
(31.303) (14.913) (14.827) (16.503) (14.864)
N 168 278 181 168 168
R2 0.960 0.397 0.540 0.564
No. of Groups 26.000 18.000 18.000 18.000
log-likelihood -267.803 -354.789 -172.806 -157.144
Within R-squared 0.397 0.540 0.564 0.578
Between R-squared 0.013 0.042 0.058 1.000
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Overall R-squared 0.024 0.031 0.023 0.958
Clustered standard errors in parentheses at country-level
Time fixed-effects included in all the models but not reported
Column 1 shows pooled OLS estimates using dissimilarity index as dependent variable, including country fixed-effects
Columns 2 - 5 use IP index as dependent variable
IP index models omit the share of females in total graduates to alleviate potential endogeneity issues
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Figure A6: Gender Differences in Cultural Values
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Figure A7: Family Decision-Making
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